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An Educational Benefit Trust (EBT) is a corporate funded employee bene-
fit plan designed to pay the college expenses of qualified employees' children.
Aside from the obvious economic benefits which result from these plans, they
arguably provide several potential federal income tax advantages to both the
corporation and participating employees:' (1) a deduction for the contributing
corporation in the year of the contribution; (2) deferral of taxation on the in-
come by the beneficiaries until the actual distribution of the trust corpus; and
(3) a recognition of the taxable income to the child recipient rather than the
employee parent.
To determine the corporate deductibility of contributions to EBT's requires
an analysis of three issues: (1) whether the contributions constitute a deductible
business expense under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code; (2) whether
these expenses are compensatory in nature; and (3) if these expenses are com-
pensatory, whether an EBT constitutes a deferred compensation plan under §
404(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The deductibility of the contributions is
necessary in order for the EBT to present the corporation with any tax advan-
tage. The determination of the compensatory nature of the contributions is
important as a prerequisite to the consideration of § 404(a); clearly if the
contributions are not compensation, their payment cannot constitute a deferred
compensation plan. Issue (3) involves, primarily, a discussion of the Tax
Court's decision in Latrobe Steel Co.,2 in which the court defined the applicable
scope of § 404(a). If EBT's are construed as § 404(a) plans, the corporation
may not deduct contributions until actual distribution from the trust. However,
if the contribution does not constitute compensation within the scope of §
404(a), the corporation obtains a current deduction. The Internal Revenue
Service maintains the deferred deduction position in its recent Revenue Ruling
on the tax consequences of an EBT.'
Alternatively, contributions to an EBT may arguably be construed as div-
idends, allowing the corporation no deduction for contributions to the plan.
The constructive dividend position is tenable if the contributions constitute either
excessive compensation or a corporate expenditure for the personal benefit of
a shareholder. A finding of excessive compensation is less onerous than a finding
of personal benefit, because only the excess portion of compensation would con-
stitute the dividend. If the contribution, however, is found to have been incurred
primarily for the personal benefit of a shareholder, the entire amount will be
construed as a dividend and the corporation will be denied the entire deduction.
1 Henkel & Hackett, An Analysis of Educational Benefit Trusts: How They Work, the
Advantages, the Problems, 42 J. or TAx. 346 (1975).
2 Latrobe Steel Co., 62 T.C. 456 (1974).
3 Rev. Rul. 75-448, 1975 INT. Rnv. BuLL. No. 42, at 6.
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In addition to the issues relating to corporate deductibility, there are two
major questions involving the taxability of the benefit provided by the trust.
The first question concerns the timing of the income taxation. If the contribu-
tions constitute compensation, there are two possible solutions: (1) at the time
the distribution is made, pursuant to § 451; or (2), as provided in § 402(b), at
some time prior to distribution to the extent that the beneficiary's interest in the
contribution has vested. The second major question is determining the tax
liability for the trust benefit: Does the qualified employee or the child beneficiary
bear the burden? Under the economic benefit theory, tax liability typically falls
on the party who actually economically benefits from the income; it does not
necessarily fall on the party who is apparently in receipt of the income.
The resolution of these issues should provide the practitioner an aid in deter-
mining the usefulness of an EBT to his corporate clients.
B. EBT Models
Before discussing these issues, it is necessary to consider the form and
operation of two typical EBT instruments. An understanding of these instru-
ments facilitates an understanding of the analysis which follows.
1. Model No. 1
X Corporation initiates a trust arrangement under which it makes predeter-
mined annual contributions. The trust is created to provide funds for edu-
cational and related expenses incurred by children of "key" 4 employees in attain-
ing college or postgraduate degrees. The instrument defines a "key" em-
ployee as any employee who has worked continuously for X Corporation for a
period of five or more years immediately prior to his inclusion in the plan, and
has attained a salary level in excess of $18,000 per year. X Corporation is of
moderate size with several employees who presently meet the requirements of
the "key" designation, and the number of such employees is likely to increase.
The corporate contributions are held by an independent trustee who main-
tains individual accounts for each potentially eligible child. When funds are
transferred to the trustee, all corporate interest is relinquished. Income earned
by the trust is distributed to each account on a pro rata basis, and extra funds
resulting from a forfeited account are also distributed pro rata. Should the trust
terminate for any reason, the funds are distributed to participating children
meeting the requirements at that time; the remainder of the trust is then distrib-
uted to XYZ College, a tax-exempt organization.
There is no limit on the number of children from any one family who may
participate in the plan. A potentially eligible child may forfeit his account for
4 By limiting the eligible employees to only "key" employees, the trust is effectively
removed from the advantages which arise under a qualified trust. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954,
§ 401(a). The Regulations provide that "in order to qualify under section 401(a), a trust
must .. . also be part of a plan under which there is no discrimination in contributions or
benefits in favor of officers, shareholders, . . . or highly compensated employees as against
other employees . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a) (1) (i) (1963).
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any of the following reasons: (1) the termination of the parent's employment
with X Corporation;5 (2) the failure of the participating child to become a
candidate for a degree at a college or university by a prescribed age;' and
(3) the failure of the participating child to incur any expenses while attending
school."
2. Model No. 2
This Model is substantially similar to Model No. 1, with the following dif-
ferences: (1) the employer corporation, Y, is a small professional corporation
with no significant planned personnel expansion, particularly in the upper
levels; and (2) only two employees qualify as "key" employees under the terms
of the trust, and they are the sole shareholders of the corporation.
II. Deductibility of Corporate Contributions
A. Ordinary and Necessary Expenses
Generally, an expense is deductible from gross income only if it meets the
requirements of § 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.8 This section allows a
deduction for all "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year ... ."' In addition, such expenses must be proximately related to
the corporation's trade or business and must be reasonable in amount.'"
Considerable litigation has developed over the meanings of "ordinary"
and "necessary" as used in § 162(a). Although it is essentially a question of
fact whether a specific expense satisfies the "ordinary and necessary" require-
ments," judicial guidelines have been formed. "Necessary" has been interpreted
to mean appropriate and helpful to the corporation in conducting its business.' 2
Thus, a necessary expense need not be indispensable to be deductible.' An
5 A variation in the plan may allow for payments to the child, upon meeting the other
requirements, when the employee parent is no longer with the corporation due to death or
disability. In such cases, the final distributions are usually proportional to the amount actually
contributed by the corporation during the employee parent's employment. In addition, the
trust might provide for the funds to "follow" the employee parent should he transfer to a
corporation offering a similar benefit and which empowers its trustee to accept such transfers.
Henkel & Hackett, supra note 1, at 347.
6 Usually, a degree at either the college or graduate school level suffices. The well-
drafted trust should provide for common time extensions such as military service or service
in the Peace Corps. See Henkel & Hackett, supra note 1, at 346.
7 Under this provision, there will be no distribution of benefits if the participating child
is able, for any reason, to attend college without expense. Where expenses are reduced by
partial scholarships, benefits of the plan are proportionately reduced. Id.
8 IN GENERaL.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness . .. .
,Mr. REy. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
9 Id.
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1975) (proximately related); Commissioner v. Lincoln
Elec. Co., 176 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1949).
11 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
12 Id. Accord, Cubbedge Snow, 31 T.C. 585, 591 (1958); Bennett's Travel Bureau, Inc.,
29 T.C. 350, 358 (1957).
13 31 T.C. at 591; B. Manischewitz Co., 10 T.C. 1139, 1145 (1948).
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"ordinary" expense, on the other hand, is an expense common to the type of
business in which the taxpayer is engaged.14 Therefore, it is not required that
the expense be habitual or normal in the sense that it is frequently or regularly
made by the same corporate taxpayer. 5 Additionally, there is no requirement
that the expense be made pursuant to a legal obligation. 6 The corporate con-
tributions involved in EBT's are appropriate and helpful, and therefore neces-
sary, because they promote good employer-employee relations; 7 and the current,
frequent business use of employee-benefit plans as integral components of a
compensation package dictates that contributions to EBT's are also ordinary. 8
As previously indicated, § 162(a) requires that the expense be proximately
related to the business operation. A contribution to an employee benefit plan
satisfies this requirement if it bears a direct relation to a consequent benefit to
the corporation.' This requirement has been liberally interpreted by the courts,
and it has generally been held that since contributions to employee benefit
plans "reasonably tend to the gratification, good will and loyalty of employees,""0
and thereby benefit the corporation, they constitute a deductible expense. A
common illustration is a contribution to provide medical facilities for employees.
These plans have long been found to directly benefit a corporation through the
"esprit de corps"'" they produce. The same rationale is applicable to contribu-
tions to EBT's since they also provide a benefit to the corporation in the form
of employee contentment.
Assuming they are reasonable in amount, it is clear that contributions to
EBT's satisfy the requirements of § 162(a) and are thus deductible. The timing
of the deduction, however, is not so clear. Section 162 (a) provides for a deduc-
tion in the year the corporation makes the contribution.22 However, Treasury
Regulation § 1.162-10(a) states that amounts contributed to employee benefit
plans are not deductible in the year contributed if those contributions provide
deferred compensation. 2 Before ascertaining whether contributions to EBT's
constitute a deferred compensation plan, it is essential to determine whether
the contributions to the EBT are compensatory in nature.
B. Compensation
Treasury Regulation § 1.162-10(a) dictates that contributions to non-
compensatory employee benefit plans when not used to provide benefits in con-
junction with a deferred compensation plan are deductible in the year contrib-
14 Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940).
15 290 U.S. at 114.
16 Champion Spark Plug Co., 30 T.C. 295, 298 (1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 347 (6th Cir.
1959); Waring Prods. Corp., 27 T.C. 921, 929 (1957).
17 See American Factors, Ltd. v. Kanne, 76 F. Supp. 133, 136 (D. Hawaii 1948),
rev'd on other grounds, 190 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1951); 4 WASHaBuRN LJ. 157, 159 (1964).
18 See Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
19 Kavai Terminal, Ltd., 36 B.T.A. 893, 896 (1937); Adam, Meldrum & Anderson Co.,
29 B.T.A. 419, 424 (1933); Sugarland Indus., 15 B.T.A. 1265, 1269 (1929).
20 76 F. Supp. at 136.
21 15 B.T.A. at 1269.
22 INT. RaV. CoDE oF 1954, § 162(a).
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1958).
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uted." In evaluating the nature of any corporate payment for § 1.162-10(a)
purposes, the intent of the contributing corporation making the payment is
relevant,25 and intent in these cases is purely a question of fact.26
Some commentators argue that while contributions to an EBT are valid
expenses under § 162(a), they are not intended as compensation. Indeed, it is
said that their purpose is to "promote and improve employee loyalty, goodwill,
efficiency and morale.' 2  Often the circumstances underlying the EBT will
establish whether the required compensatory intent actually exists. For example,
if the corporate taxpayer considered increasing the salary of a "key" employee,
but instead made contributions to an EBT, there is little doubt that the under-
lying corporate intent was to compensate the employee. Similarly, a require-
ment that employees included in an EBT undergo a salary adjustment to reflect
the number of their potentially eligible children indicates the compensatory
intent behind the contribution.28 The common element in these situations is
that the benefit conferred upon the employee is dependent on the services per-
formed by the employee. Even where the circumstances do not clearly indicate
the necessary compensatory intent, it may be possible to imply such an intent
from the existence of a dependency relation. In other words, where an employee
receives a benefit based on the level of services he renders, the implication is
that the benefit is intended as compensation.
Even those who claim that contributions to an EBT are not compensatory
in nature recognize that the substance of compensation involves payments re-
lated to the quantity and quality of services performed by an employee.
Whether EBT contributions are in fact related to services is undecided. A "key"
employee must meet a prescribed quantitative and qualitative measure of
work."0 The quantitative measure is the prior length of service requirement and
the continued employment requirement seen in Model No. 1. The relation be-
tween the benefit and the quality of services is evidenced by the salary level
requirement of Model No. 1. Unless a certain minimum level of service is
achieved, determined by the amount of salary paid, the benefit does not flow
to the employee. A more typical situation that illustrates this relation between
level of services and compensation is the bonus awarded salesmen on achieving
certain quotas. Normally, the bonus figure is directly related to a specific level
of performance. This proportional dependence between payment and perfor-
mance reflects compensatory intent. Similarly, the establishment of this relation
24 Id. This section states that contributions to employee benefit plans are deductible under§ 162(a) unless they provide benefits under a § 404(a) deferred compensation plan.
25 See Schwartzman, Executive Fringes: A Look at Some New and/or Exotic Benefits,
N.Y.U. 32D INST. ON FED. TAX. 925 (1974); Peters v. Smith, 221 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1955).
26 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960); Bogardus v. Commissioner,
302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937).
27 Henkel & Hackett, supra note 1, at 348.
28 Id. at 349.
29 In supporting their claim that EBT contributions are not compensation, some com-
mentators argue that they are unrelated to the quantity or quality of services rendered. The
implication of this argument is that the existence of such a relation is the substance of com-
pensation. Id. at 348.




supports the conclusion that the corporate contribution to an EBT is compen-
sation.
In Revenue Ruling 75-448,"' the Internal Revenue Service also concluded
that contributions to EBT's are made with compensatory intent. The Service
stated:
The compensatory character of the contributions is established by the fact
that the amounts are contributed on the basis of the parent's employment
and earnings record, rather than on the basis of competitive criteria, such
as need, merit or motivation.32
Apparently, then, the Service also relied on this dependency relation between
the benefit (EBT contributions) and the services rendered in establishing the
corporation's intent to compensate. Since contributions to the EBT are com-
pensation, it is necessary to determine whether the method of contribution con-
stitutes a deferred compensation plan within the meaning of § 404(a) in order
to fix the timing of the deduction.
C. § 404(a): Before and After Latrobe Steel
As indicated previously, the general rule is that compensation paid by an
employer is deductible from corporate income in the year it is paid." Section
404(a), however, provides an exception; payments to a stock bonus, pension,
profit-sharing, or annuity plan or compensation "paid or accrued on account
of any employee under a plan deferring the receipt of such compensation,"3 4
are specifically excluded from the current deduction provision in § 162(a),"
and are included under the less advantageous provisions of § 404(a). Prior to
Latrobe, this section was interpreted as including every plan which had the
effect of deferring compensation.
1. Seven-Up Bottling
The Tax Court broadly defined the applicable scope of § 404(a) in New
York Seven-Up Bottling Co. 6 The court considered a severance pay benefit
trust, under the terms of which benefits were paid to employees upon termination
of their employment with the Seven-Up Company. The trust further provided
31 Rev. Rul. 75-448, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 42, at 6. The facts of this ruling indicate
a plan similar to that in Model No. 1. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
32 Id.
33 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1958).
34 Id.
35 Section 404(a) provides the following special deduction rules: (a) qualified pension
trusts in the taxable year when paid, in the amount not in excess of five percent of the total
compensation paid or accrued to employees under the trust; (b) qualified annuities are de-
ducted in accordance with (a); (c) qualified stock bonus and profit sharing in the taxable
year when paid in an amount not in excess of 15 percent of compensation otherwise paid to
employees under the plan; and (d) other plans in the year in which an amount attributable
to the contribution is includible in the gross income of employees participating in the plan.
INT. REV. CODE. oF 1954, § 404(a).
36 50 T.C. 391 (1968).
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that if the accrued benefits were not utilized by the employer, a lump sum pay-
ment would be made to the employee at his retirement or to his estate at his
death. In concluding that the trust constituted a deferred compensation plan,
the court held that § 404(a) was not limited strictly to the four types of plans
listed in the section (stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity), but ap-
plied to all plans which had the effect of deferring the receipt of compensation."7
This decision was relied upon by a federal district court in Lundy Packing Co. v.
United States."s A sick-pay plan, which guraranteed unused funds to the em-
ployees upon termination or their estates at death, was also considered within
the confines of § 404(a), despite its apparent dissimilarity to any of the four
enumerated plans.
2. "Similar Test"
Six years after the New York Seven-Up decision, however, the Tax Court
in Latrobe Steel Co. significantly modified its holding. While New York Seven-
Up applied § 404(a) to any plan which deferred compensation, the ruling in
Latrobe severely limited the section's application under a newly created "similar"
test. In 1963, the taxpayer, Latrobe, entered into a labor agreement with the
United Steelworkers of America which, as later amended, provided for an ex-
tended vacation plan to supplement the regular vacation plan. The agreement
provided that any employee with one or more years of continuous service would
be eligible for a regular vacation ranging from one to four weeks, depending on
his length of service. To facilitate expanded employment, the agreement further
provided an extended vacation plan for qualifying employees, allowing not less
than seven but not more than 13 weeks of consecutive time off.39 After
an employee's right to the vacation vested, he became eligible for the extended
benefits once every five years. And the plan provided that upon death, the vaca-
tion pay then due an employee would be paid to his wife or his estate.
The Tax Court unanimously40 held that the trust arrangement was beyond
the meaning of deferred compensation plans under § 404(a), and therefore
allowed the corporation to deduct its contribution in the year paid. The court
relied on the congressional intent underlying § 404(a); § 404(a) has special
rules governing the deductibility of corporate contributions to qualified stock
bonus, pension, profit-sharing, and annuity plans, and "other" plans. Since the
trust was not one of these enumerated plans, the court was forced to consider the
scope of "other" plans.
Seeking guidance in the area, the court noted that § 23(p) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 193941 was identical to § 404(a) and, therefore, considered
37 50 T.O. at 398.
38 302 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.C. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1970).
39 Under the extended vacation plan, at the beginning of the employee's 13 week period
he is paid in full for his vacation time. Those employees who so desire may receive the 13
weeks pay, and return to work anytime after the seventh week, receiving additional pay for
work done during that early return period. 62 T.C. at 459.
40 There were three judges concurring.
41 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 502, § 162(b), 56 Stat. 863, amending INT. R v. CoDE oF
1939, § 23 (p).
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the legislative history of the earlier provision to represent the congressional in-
terpretation of "other" plans. Although a different version of § 23(p) was
finally enacted, the originally proposed § 2 3 (p) provided in part:
If compensation for personal services rendered is paid or accrued on ac-
count of any employee under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or
annuity plan, or similar plan deferring the receipt of such compensation,
then such compensation shall... be deductible ... under this subsection.
If there is no plan but the method of compensating for personal services has
the effect of a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan, or
similar plan deferring the receipt of compensation, this paragraph shall
apply as if there was such a plan.42
The court considered the phrase "similar plan" significant, and referred to
congressional committee reports in an attempt to properly interpret the scope of
that phrase. The House Ways and Means Report employed the phrase "similar
plan" when explaining that § 23(p) was applicable to contributions under any
of the four enumerated plans, or "similar plan deferring the receipt of such com-
pensation."43 The report added that deductions would not be allowed for pay-
ments under such a similar plan until the year in which the compensation was
actually paid to the employee. In both the Senate4 4 and House45 reports for §
23 (p), Congress indicated that its concern with deferred compensation plans was
limited to only certain types of plans. The reports noted that the purpose of §
23 (p) and related sections was to specifically ensure that stock bonus, pension,
profit-sharing, and annuity plans did not discriminate in favor of corporate
executives. In light of this limited concern, it is clear that by using the words
"similar plan" in the proposed section, Congress intended that the section was not
applicable to any plan which deferred the receipt of compensation. Congress
only attempted to prevent circumvention of the section by plans basically
identical to the four specifically set out, but which were otherwise excepted due
to minor form differences.
Accordingly, the Latrobe court devised the "similar test" analysis;4" §
404(a) is thus applicable only to the four enumerated plans, or to other deferred
compensation plans that have characteristics similar to the four. The Treasury
Regulations under § 23 (p)4" and § 404(a)48 provide support for this conclusion.
While each states that its respective sections are not restricted to formal stock
bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plans or other deferred compensation
plans, they also limit the sections' application to the four or "similar plans."
For many years prior to Latrobe, the Tax Court viewed § 404(a) as being
applicable to any deferred compensation plan. This construction was attribut-
42 H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 113-16 (1942) (emphasis added).
43 H.R. REP. No. 2333, 1942-2 CuM. BULL. 372, 451.
44 See S. REP. No. 1631, 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 504, 607-09.
45 See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 1942-2 CuM. BULL. 451-52.
46 The majority opinion never formally named the standard it established, but Judge
Raum, in a concurring opinion, labeled it the "similiar test." 62 T.C. at 468.
47 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(p)-l(c) (1948).
48 Treas. Reg. § 1.404(b)-i (1956).
[December 1975]
[Vol. 51:303]
able to a literal interpretation of § 404(a), and not to an interpretation
based on the section's historical purpose. Again, the final enacted version of §
23(p) differed from the section as originally introduced; the enacted version
stating in part:
If contributions are paid by an employer to or under a stock bonus, pension,
profit-sharing, or annuity plan, or if compensation is paid or accrued on
account of any employee under a plan deferring the receipt of such com-
pensation, such contributions or compensation shall ... be deductible under
this subsection.
If there is no plan 'but a method of employer contributions or compensation
has the effect of a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan, or
similar plan deferring the receipt of compensation, this paragraph shall apply
as if there was such a plan.
49
In the first part of the enacted version, Congress substituted the phrase "under
a plan deferring" for "similar plan." This later enacted version of § 23(p)
is identical to § 404(a), which also makes the limited mention of "similar plan."
Only § 23 (p)'s legislative history provided interpretative value for the omission.
The Senate Finance Committee Report stated that the change in language was
motivated only by a desire to bring the language of § 23(p) into conformity
with other sections of the Code and was of no interpretative significance." The
court, therefore, concluded that despite the absence of the words "similar plan,"
its understood meaning is impliedly present in the current section's references to
other deferred compensation plans.5s
3. Inadequate Standards
Although the Latrobe court properly employed the "similar" test in §
404(a), the court failed to adequately define the standards for applying the test.
This prompted a concurring judge to correctly conclude that "[u]ntil such time,.
however, that the standards for applicability do become clear, taxpayers and
their planners face an uncertain and haphazard road in planning their affairs.""s
The majority opinion only generally intimated what is required under the
similar test. An illustration of the inadequacy of these general "standards"
is found in their application as made by the Latrobe court to the facts of the
earlier New York Seven-Up case. Referring to the applicable Treasury Regula-
tions,"3 the court summarily defined pension and annuity plans as plans which
49 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(p) (emphasis added).
50 S. REP. No. 1631, 1942-2 CuM. BULL. 607.
51 Additionally, the Tax Court supported its position on this issue by pointing to the
presence of the phrase "similar plan" in the second part of the section quoted in the text.
To conclude otherwise would result in the inconsistency of subjecting all formal
deferred-compensation plans to the strict deduction rules of section 23(p) (1), but
permitting a plan not similar to the four enumerated plans to escape those strict
rules by simply transforming that plan to a method of contributions having the effect
of a plan.
62 T.C. at 464.
52 62 T.C. at 469.




supply employees with "actuarialy determinable benefits upon retirement."' 4
In modifying its New York Seven-Up decision, the Tax Court in Latrobe noted
that the result of the prior case would not be changed by its newly restricted
interpretation. The Latrobe court found the severance pay plan in New York
Seven-Up was sufficiently similar to a pension plan to invoke § 404(a), even
though the plan lacked the two elements--actuarially determinable benefits and
distribution upon retirement-which the court had previously considered to be
the substance of pension plans. The summary treatment given pension and
annuity plans was similarly accorded to profit-sharing and stock bonus plans. The
court concluded that these plans are merely a means through which employees
can share in their employer's profits,55 without further indicating what character-
istics of these plans the court would consider necessary to a finding of similarity.
The scope of the court's standards is thus impossible to determine from the
opinion, and only further litigation or congressional intervention will provide
suitable guidelines. It is unlikely that the Internal Revenue Service will promul-
gate any helpful rulings on the issue in the near future, since it has not yet in-
dicated what action it will take on the Latrobe decision. Presently, however, it
is doubtful that an EBT is sufficiently similar to a stock bonus, pension, profit-
sharing, or annuity plan to bring it within the confines of § 404(a). The con-
tributions to the EBT are clearly not intended as postretirement or even post-
termination benefits since, as Model No. 1 provides, any rights to these contri-
butions are forfeited upon termination of employment.5" Similarly, the contribu-
tions are not related in any way to the profits of the business, but rather are pro-
portional to the amount of expenses incurred by each child. Therefore, as
ordinary and necessary expenses which do not constitute deferred compensation,
corporate contributions to EBT's should be deductible by the corporation in the
year contributed.
4. The Service's Position
This conclusion is, however, contrary to the Internal Revenue Service's find-
ings in Rev. Rul. 75-448." There the Service held that solely because the plan
defers the receipt of compensation, contributions to the EBT fall within §
404(a) and are thus not deductible "until an amount attributable to the con-
54 62 T.C. at 464.
55 Id.
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1972) provides:
A pension plan . . .is a plan established and maintained by an employer pri-
marily to provide systematically for the payment of definitely determinable benefits
to his employees over a period of years, usually for life, after retirement.
Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-3(a) (1972) provides: "[A]nnuity plan means a pension plan under
which retirement benefits are provided under annuity or insurance contracts without a trust."
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (ii) provides: "A profit-sharing plan is a plan established
and maintained by an employer to provide for the participation in his profits by his employees
or their beneficiaries."
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-(b) (1) (iii) (1972) provides:
A stock bonus plan is a plan established and maintained by an employer to
provide benefits similar to those of a profit-sharing plan, except that the contributions
by the employer are not necessarily dependent upon profits and the benefits are dis-
tributable in stock of the employer company.
58 Rev. Rul. 75-448, 1975 INT. Rav. BuLL. No. 42, at 6.
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tribution is includible in the gross income" of participating employees. This
position is clearly inconsistent with the Tax Court's holding in Latrobe and may
signal the Service's intention to appeal that decision. Indeed, should the Service
acquiesce in the Latrobe decision, the Ruling's effectiveness would be substantially
diminished.
It is too early to conclude with any certainty whether the Service will suc-
ceed in its apparent attempt to reject the Latrobe decision and defer a corpora-
tion's deduction for its contribution to an EBT. While the deferral of the deduc-
tion poses serious tax disadvantages to the corporation which should be fully
considered before employing such an arrangement, the possibility that its con-
tribution may constitute a dividend is even more ominous.
III. Constructive Dividends
A. Background
Section 301 of the Internal Revenue Code5" provides that a distribution of
property"0 by a corporation to its shareholders is a dividend as long as the
corporation has undistributed earnings and profits.6" Additionally, Treasury
Regulation § 1.301-1 (c) 2 requires that the distribution be made to the share-
holder in his shareholder capacity. Thus, a distribution to a shareholder is not a
dividend if the distribution is made to him as a creditor rather than as a share-
holder. Typically, dividends are formally declared and distributed by the
corporation, with each shareholder receiving a benefit in proportion to his hold-
ings. However, the fact that the corporation does not formally declare a
dividend," or that the distribution is to only some of the shareholders"4 and not in
proportion to their holdings,65 will not necessarily preclude a court from con-
struing the distribution as a dividend.
Corporations often attempt to disguise distributions of earnings to share-
holders as deductible business expenses. A corporation may argue that payments
made to its shareholder employees are compensation for services rendered. How-
ever, if the payments are unreasonable in amount in light of the services actually
rendered by the shareholder employee, a court may find the excess amount con-
stitutes a constructive or disguised dividend. Similarly, a corporation may
attempt to deduct contributions to an employee accident and health plan under
§ 162(a). Where the only employees to benefit under the plan are shareholders,
however, a court is likely to find that the purpose of the corporate contribution
59 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301.
60 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 317: "For purposes of this part, the term 'property' means
money, securities, and any other property."
61 INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 316(a): "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle,
every distribution is made out of earnings and profits to the extent thereof, and from the most
recently accumulated earnings and profits."
62 Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(c) (1973).
63 Biltmore Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 825 (1961).
64 Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946).
65 Gibbs v. Tomlinson, 362 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1966).
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was to benefit the employees as shareholders and not as employees."6 Should this
be the case, then the contribution is again a constructive dividend and not a
deductible business expense.1
7
Thus, corporate characterizations of contributions are not controlling."
Indeed, the courts often find that the true nature of the contribution is contrary
to expressed corporate intent.6 " Therefore, in applying § 301 courts generally
conclude that a corporate contribution which in fact confers an "economic
benefit on the stockholder without the expectation of repayment" is a construc-
tive dividend. 70  The courts in these cases are concerned with the substance,
not the form, of the benefit plan and attempt to determine the practical effect
of the corporate contribution.7 In Model No. 2, then, notwithstanding the fact
that the contributions are ostensibly made to benefit employees, a court may
construe the contributions to the EBT as dividends."2
B. Alternate Theories
There are two theories by which the contributions made in Model No. 2
may be viewed as constructive dividends. If the contributions constitute compen-
sation they may be excessive in amount, the unreasonable portion constituting
a dividend. Alternatively, the contribution may be viewed as a corporate pay-
ment for the personal benefit of the shareholder. Here, the entire contribution
is a dividend and consequently no corporate deduction is available.
1. Excessive Compensation
Assuming that the contributions to the trust are compensatory, only the
"reasonable" portion of the compensation may be deducted by the corporation.
Under this theory the tax disadvantage to the corporation is relatively moderate,
since only the amount of compensation above the reasonable level is deemed a
dividend.74 Treasury Regulation § 1.162-7 (b) (1) states that when
salaries are in excess of those ordinarily paid for similar services, and the
excessive payments correspond or bear a close relationship to the stock-
holdings of the officers or employees it would seem likely that ... the ex-
cessive payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock. 75
The corporate-shareholder relationship implies that the compensation is not
wholly for services rendered, but that the excess amount represents a payment
66 See Alan B. Larkin, 48 T.C. 629 (1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968).
67 Id.
68 See also Sachs v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
833 (1960).
69 Helvering v. Gordon, 87 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1937).
70 362 F.2d at 397.
71 277 F.2d at 882; 87 F.2d at 666.
72 See 48 T.C. 629.
73 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (1) states that a deduction is allowed for "a reason-
able allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered."




"made because of the recipients proprietary investment in the corporation." 6
If the Internal Revenue Service considers the amount of compensation un-
reasonable, the burden is on the corporation to prove the reasonableness of the
total compensation figure."' This burden is typically satisfied by showing the
amount paid corresponds to services actually rendered or with the compensation
levels of similarly situated employees in other corporations. 8
Should the corporation fail to meet this burden, the effect is twofold: (1)
the corporation incurs an expense, without receiving a concurrent benefit, in the
amount of the excess compensation; and (2) the corporation is denied a deduc-
tion for that expense. The trust arrangement, however, can be drafted to miti-
gate these effects of the constructive dividend finding. The trust should provide
that if the corporate contributions are found by the Internal Revenue Service to
be excess compensation to shareholder employees, the excess amounts must be
returned to the corporation. Under § 162(a), the shareholder employee could
then deduct the amount returned. A deduction pursuant to a similar repayment
plan has been approved by the Service in Rev. Rul. 69-115."9 There, salaries
had been paid to the four shareholders of the corporation subject to a resolution
adopted by the corporation. The resolution obligated the shareholders to return
the amount of their salaries which the Service disallowed as deductible business
expenses to the corporation. The Ruling held that the shareholders were
entitled to a deduction for the amount returned since it was repaid under a legal
obligation originating prior to the payment of the salaries. Accordingly, to be
successful from the shareholder perspective, the repayment agreement must be
executed prior to the actual date of the contributions to the EBT 0 and must
also constitute a legal obligation enforceable against the shareholder; a repay-
ment pursuant to a voluntary plan will not be allowed a deduction by the
Service."1
By using a repayment agreement, the corporation has little to lose in at-
tempting the disguised dividends. If the corporation successfully disguises the
distribution, it receives a deduction for that portion of the contributions which
is actually a dividend and the repayment agreement is not activated. However,
if the excessive portion of the contribution is recognized as a dividend, the
corporation's losses are minimized by the agreement. While the corporation loses
a deduction equal to the excess amount, the shareholder is obligated to repay that
amount; thus, the corporation's loss is limited to its inability to use that money
while it is under the shareholder's control. In addition, the shareholder is given
a deduction for the amount repaid, placing him in substantially the same posi-
tion he would have been in had the trust contribution never been made.
76 4A J. MERTENs, THn LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.64, at 293 (J. Malone
ed. 1972).
77 Roth Office Equip. Co. v. Gallagher, 172 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1949).
78 See generally MERT-NS, supra note 76, §§ 25.68-83, at 308-43.
79 Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 50.
80 It is also in the employee's interest to provide the repayment clause at the start of the
trust rather than at a later date; a later agreement may be viewed with suspicion by the
Service as a means of circumventing the regulation. See Nims, Minimizing Constructize
Dividend Exposure, TUL. 16TH TAX INST. 259 (1966).
81 Stuetzer, Reasonable Compensation, N.Y.U. 25TH1 INST. ON FEm. TAx. 491, 507 (1967).
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While application of the constructive dividend theory to compensation has
traditionally been limited to situations in which the amount of compensation is
unreasonable, a recent Court of Claims case has substantially expanded its ap-
plication. Charles McCandless Tile Service v. United States" created a new
facet in this compensation dividend relation: the "automatic dividend" rule."3
There, a father and son who were officers, shareholders, and employees of the
corporation controlled the distribution of earnings and determined their levels of
compensation. The court specifically found that the salaries paid to the share-
holder employees were reasonable in view of the services performed by them, but
disallowed a portion of the deduction for the salaries because no dividends were
declared or distributed by the highly profitable corporation for a five year period.
Some portions of the salaries paid to its shareholder employees, the court
reasoned, must be a distribution of earnings. Thus, despite a compensatory
scheme that is reasonable in amount, a portion of the contributions in Model
No. 2 may nevertheless be dividends, and therefore nondeductible, if the corpora-
tion fails to otherwise provide formal dividends.
2. Personal Benefit
A determination that the contributions are constructive dividends is not
limited to the situation in which those contributions are excess compensation for
services rendered. The same result occurs when the contributions are payments
for the personal benefit of a shareholder. "The crucial concept in finding a con-
structive dividend is that the corporation conferred an economic benefit on the
stockholder without the expectation of repayment."'"
Whether a distribution is for the economic benefit of the shareholder de-
pends on whether the corporate payment is primarily for the benefit of the cor-
poration or for the personal benefit of the shareholders. 5 For example, a corpo-
rate payment which discharges a shareholder's legal obligation is universally
recognized as a dividend. 6 However, if the same payment primarily discharges
a corporate obligation, such as compensating the shareholder employee for
services, and thereby incidentally benefits the shareholder, there is no dividend. 7
This theory, then, dictates that when the contributions to an EBT in fact con-
stitute reasonable compensation, there is no dividend."8 The contributions are
primarily intended to discharge the corporation's obligation to compensate the
shareholder employee for his services; from the corporation's standpoint, the
benefit to the shareholder is only incidental.
It is arguable, however, that contributions in Model No. 2 do not constitute
compensation and thus may be characterized as simply for the personal benefit of
82 442 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
83 See Holden, Has Court of Claims Adopted an "Automatic Dividend" Rule in Com-
pensation Cases?, 32 J. OF TAX. 331 (1970).
84 362 F.2d at 397.
85 See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPaORnTONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 7.05, at 7-27 (3d ed. 1971).
86 See, e.g., Sullivan v. United States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966).
87 See, e.g., Joseph MeReynolds, 17 B.T.A. 331 (1929).
88 See, e.g., Alex Silverman, 28 T.C. 1061 (1957).
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the shareholder. Admittedly, under the facts of Model Nos. 1 and 2, the amount
of benefit is not totally dependent upon services rendered and thus the existence
of a compensatory intent motivating the contributions might be questioned. In
either model the amount of service is only initially important in that it determines
who is included under the plan. When an employee has met this original require-
ment, his benefits increase with the number of his children participating in the
plan, regardless of the amount of additional services he renders to the corpora-
tion. The courts, however, are more likely to scrutinize Model No. 2, since
corporate payments to shareholder employees are particularly suspect.89 The
rationale is that expenditures which benefit only shareholders may be disguised
corporate distributions not motivated by any real compensatory intent. The
possibility exists that the superficial compensatory nature of the contribution
might be considered a facade and thus construed as a dividend.
The conclusion that contributions to an EBT are not compensation does not
necessarily render them dividends; if any legitimate corporate interest is served
by the contribution, it will be allowed as a deductible business expense. However,
if the contributions are not compensation, it is difficult to conclude that they
serve any purpose other than the personal benefit of shareholders included in the
plan. An analogous situation was presented in Noble v. Commissioner.90 There
the court considered a corporate reimbursement to shareholders for expenses in-
curred in repairing their residences. The court held that the repair expenditures
were not related to any corporate business purpose but were strictly of a personal
nature. Their reimbursement, therefore, constituted a dividend. "1
Similarly, then, when contributions to EBT's are noncompensatory and
serve no corporate business purpose, they are dividends. If, for example, the
EBT obligated the receiving child to work for the company for a prescribed
period following his graduation as a condition to receiving the benefit, that
obligation might be viewed as a benefit to the corporation. Then, the corporate
contribution might be recognized as serving a corporate interest. Model No. 2
provides no such obligation, however.
The fact that the payments are not made to the shareholder directly is of no
legal significance, since the contribution is constructively received by him. This
principle originated in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,"2 which held
that the discharge of an employee's obligation by a corporation constituted
taxable income to the employee. The Court viewed the discharge as a constructive
payment to the employee who then used the amount to discharge his own obliga-
tion. Under this principle, EBT contributions would be recognized as a con-
structive payment to the shareholder who then makes contributions to the trust.
The fairness of this conclusion is supported by the fact that the shareholder, as
part owner of the corporation, is at least partly responsible for directing the
corporation to bypass him in distributing its earnings and profits.
In conclusion, if a corporation attempts to avoid a confrontation with the
89 See 1 MERTENS, supra note 76, § 9.18, at 57.
90 368 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1966).
91 Id. at 443.
92 279 U.S. 71 (1929).
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Internal Revenue Service on the issue of deferred compensation by attempting
to show that the contributions were not made with a compensatory intent, it
could be creating a far greater problem. Rather than incurring the disadvantages
of a deferred deduction under Rev. Rul. 75-448, the corporation risks the denial
of any deduction under the theory of constructive dividends.
IV. Taxing the Receipt of Income
A. Timing
When the contributions to an EBT will be taxed as realized income is an
equally important inquiry. Whether the taxable event occurs at the time of
contribution or at the time of distribution depends upon the nature of the con-
tribution.
1. Noncompensatory Fringe Benefits
Section 451 of the Internal Revenue Code9 dictates that income is generally
not taxable until the year it is actually or constructively received by the taxpayer.
Clearly, where the contribution to the EBT is a noncompensatory fringe benefit,
there is no actual receipt of income until the trust corpus is distributed. There-
fore, trust benefits must be constructively received before actual distribution to
constitute taxable income prior to that time. Treasury Regulation § 1.451-2(a)
states: "income is not constructively received if the taxpayers' control of its
receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions." '94 In addition, § 1.451-
2 (a) provides that income is constructively received by the taxpayer in the tax-
able year
during which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise
made available so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could
have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to with-
draw had been given.95
Basically, these principles are interpreted to mean that "if all the taxpayer has
to do is reach for the receipt, this will be sufficient." '98 Physical control over the
income is not necessary; it is sufficient if the taxpayer can control the dis-
position of the income.9
The typical EBT does not provide sufficient control of the participating
child's account to satisfy the requirements of constructive receipt. At any time
prior to the actual distribution, all rights in the trust are subject to substantial
93 INT. RaV. CoiDs oF 1954, § 451: "(a) GENERAL RULE-The amount of any item of
gross income shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which received
by the taxpayer."
94 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1971).
95 Id.
96 J. CHOMMm, THE LAW oF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 82, at 229 (2d ed. 1973).




risks of forfeiture. No control exists outside the trust itself. Accordingly, if
the EBT is viewed as a noncompensatory fringe benefit, no tax should be assessed
until distribution."
2. Compensation
The Tax Court decision in Latrobe indicates that if the contribution is
deemed to be nondeferred compensation, § 451 delays the recognition of taxable
income until actual or constructive receipt. More specifically, to the extent the
EBT is not covered by the deferred compensation sections of the Code, the
benefits emanating from the trust are taxed in accordance with § 451. However,
should the courts adopt the Service's position that EBT's provide deferred com-
pensation, § 402(b) would control the timing of the taxation. Section 402(b)
of the Code99 controls the taxability of corporate contributions to nonexempt
deferred compensation trusts. Under that section, the contributions are inclu-
dible in the gross income of the beneficiary when made, but only if and to the
extent that the beneficiary's interest in the plan is vested.
An interest is vested if it is transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture as defined by the Treasury Regulations under § 83.10 A transferable
interest is merely one capable of transfer to another individual.' An interest
is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if the beneficiary's rights to full enjoy-
ment of his interest are conditioned on future performance, or nonperformance, of
services by any individual."0 2 If, however, the beneficiary's interest is forfeitable
at the time of contribution, the Regulations provide that such amounts are not
included in gross income in the year of contribution or in the year they become
nonforfeitable. 0 3 Instead, the amount contributed is taxable in the year dis-
tributed or made available to the beneficiary under the trust.
Therefore, even if constituting a deferred compensation plan under §
404(a), correctly drafted EBT's should provide no taxable income until the year
in which college expenses are incurred by the participating child. This is ac-
complished by providing, as Model Nos. 1 and 2 do, conditions of forfeiture that
may become effective at any time prior to the actual distribution.114  For
example, forfeiture can occur upon termination of the parent's employment with
the corporation, or upon failure of the child to actually incur expenses.
98 It has been concluded that the contributions are compensation; see text accompanying
notes 24-31 supra.
99 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 402(b): "Contributions to an employees trust . . . shall
be included in the gross income of the employee in accordance with section 83. ..
INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 83(a):
[such property] shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed
the services in the first taxable year in which the rights of the person having the
beneficial interest in such property are transferable or not subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable.
100 Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(a)(1) (1966).
101 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(d) (1971).
102 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.8 3-3(c) (1971).
103 Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(a)(1) (1966).




If the EBT benefit is construed as a dividend, tax liability should be assessed
at the time of the corporate contribution, not the trust distribution. As noted
previously, in applying the principle of Old Colony Trust, the corporate contribu-
tions are to be considered a payment to the shareholder which is then transferred
by him to the trust. It is of no consequence that the payment actually bypasses
the shareholder and goes directly to the trust. It is axiomatic that a shareholder
may not defer the recognition of dividend income merely because dividends were
never formally declared." 5 Conceptually, there is little difference between a
shareholder directing that his dividends be held by the corporation for his benefit
and a shareholder directing that they be distributed to a third party also for his
benefit. In both instances, the shareholder lacks actual receipt of the dividends,
though he receives the benefit. The two situations should be treated alike: a
shareholder should not be permitted to delay taxation by a transfer to the trust.
B. Personal Liability
In the nondividend situation, there remains the question of who incurs
the income tax liability: the qualified employee or the beneficiary child.'
Rev. Rul. 75-488 concludes that when distribution rights become vested, "the
parent-employee of the child who has incurred the expenses is required to
include the amount of the distribution in his gross income."'07 To the extent
that the contributions are noncompensatory, certain factual circumstances must
exist before this conclusion can be supported under the economic benefit theory.
For example, if the child's college expenses are incurred by the parents directly,
such that they assume personal liability for them, the parent is taxable for the
amount of the contribution attributable to those expenses. The general principle
dictates that when a third party discharges the personal liability of a taxpayer,
the discharge is income to the taxpayer in the amount by which the obligation
is reduced.' The rationale underlying this theory is that the taxpayer receives
an economic benefit since his assets would otherwise be required to meet this
liability. The payment then by the third party is treated as a cash equivalent. The
same result would obtain if the child technically incurred the expense in his own
name, but the parent had an underlying legal obligation to meet the costs."0 9 If
the child, however, incurs the expense on his own and there is no concurrent
obligation on the parent's part, the distribution clearly economically benefits the
child." 0 In this latter situation it is the child who realizes the income as recipient
of the benefit.''
105 2 MERTENS, supra note 76, § 10.99, at 34-35.
106 Obviously, when the contribution is considered a dividend, the shareholder is deemed
in receipt of taxable income.
107 Rev. Rul. 75-488, 1975 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 42, at 6.
108 See 279 U.S. 716.
109 For example, the underlying legal obligation could be pursuant to a child support
statute, a divorce decree, or contract which required the employee parent to meet these
expenses.
110 Obviously, in a situation where the parent is not obligated to provide a college educa-
tion for his child, a free college education primarily benefits the child who receives it.
111 See Henkel & Hackett, supra note 1. at 346.
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The same considerations are again involved when a distribution is deemed
compensation. Although in its Revenue Ruling the Service concluded that a
distribution is taxable as compensation to the parent, when payments do not
result in the discharge of a legal obligation the income is taxable to the child
beneficiary. In Paul A. Teschner,"2 the Tax Court considered the taxability of
a prize that was won through the efforts of Teschner, but was payable to his
daughter. In accordance with the rules of the contest, Teschner was not eligible
to receive the prize himself, and could only designate the recipient. Teschner
selected his daughter, who later received the prize. From this arrangement, he
contended that the prize money should be included in his daughter's income
rather than in his own. The Commissioner, however, contended that the prize
constituted compensation to Teschner, and as such was includible in his income.
This conclusion was based on the premise that compensation is to be attributed,
as taxable income, to the person who earns it."8 The Tax Court, in holding for
Teschner, narrowed the application of that principle used by the Service. The
court stated that when "an individual neither receives nor has the right to receive
income, he is not the taxable individual.""1 4 In this case, Teschner had the power
to appoint the recipient of the prize, but he had no power to dispose of the in-
come. The power to designate the beneficiary, unlike the power to dispose, was
not sufficient to give him any right to receive the income.
Applying the Teschner holding to an EBT situation, it is apparent that the
employee is not the recipient of taxable income. Not only is he without the power
to dispose of the income, but he also lacks the power to designate its recipient;
he neither receives nor has any right to receive the income. Therefore, the
child beneficiary actually receiving the distribuiion is the proper party to be
taxed.
V. Conclusion
Provided the EBT does not take the form of a constructive dividend, it is
a viable, tax-advantageous employee fringe benefit. When contributions are
made with intent to compensate, and are offset by actually rendered services,
deductibility is certain. Moreover, the contributions do not fall within the
deferred deduction provisions of § 404(a), as interpreted by Latrobe. It is diffi-
cult to conceive of any basis which could support a finding that an EBT contri-
bution is similar to a pension, stock bonus, profit sharing, or annuity plan. This
is not to say, however, that the Internal Revenue Service's ruling on EBT's will
be ineffective. Until the ruling is successfully challenged, cautious tax advisors
will probably direct their clients away from this type of fringe benefit. While
the Service will perhaps achieve less success through this indirect rejection of
the Latrobe Steel decision than it might otherwise realize on appeal, it avoids
the more substantial risk of losing an appeal.
112 Paul A. Teschner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962). The appeal in this case was dismissed for
lack of prosecution. It should also be noted that, although still good law, the court was
sharply divided, with seven judges dissenting.
113 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
114 38 T.C. at 1009.
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It must be recognized that the major tax advantage, the immediate deduc-
tion, rests largely on the Latrobe Steel case. A reversal of Latrobe Steel on ap-
peal could substantially alter the tax advantages by reinvoking the much broader
interpretation of New York Seven-Up. Until such time, however, the EBT
should be considered primarily in light of Latrobe Steel. The corporate con-
tribution should be recognized as a business expense which is deductible in the
year it is made, regardless of the year the trust corpus is distributed. Although
compensation to the employee, the child beneficiary will generally be the taxable
party; however, no tax should be assessed until the funds are actually distributed.
Prior to distribution there is not sufficient control over his child's account to con-
stitute a taxable interest.
When the contributions are restricted to the benefit of shareholders only,
whether by express designation or by actual operation, the tax advantages of
the EBT are significantly diminished. In such a situation, the courts are likely
to construe the contributions as corporate distributions for the personal benefit
of its shareholders. Accordingly, the corporation would be denied any deduction
for its contribution. A similar result would obtain, though to a lesser degree,
if the contributions were found to be excessive compensation. Additionally,
under the McCandless Tile rationale, a corporation risks a finding that part of
even reasonable compensation may be deemed a dividend, absent a history of
formally declared dividends.
The facts of Model No. 2 strongly support a constructive dividend con-
clusion, primarily on the basis of the personal benefit theory. Not only will the
corporation lose its deduction, but the shareholder should be prepared for an
immediate tax assessment against him under an application of constructive
receipt principles. Accordingly, a corporation seeking to disguise a distribution
of earnings should consider a less conspicuous arrangement.
John Gaal
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